We estimate a theory-based modified gravity model to analyze the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China on FDI to other countries over the period [1990][1991][1992][1993][1994][1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004]. Our results suggest that on average, ceteris paribus, FDI flows to China have been complementary to FDI flows to other countries. However, these complementarities exhibit a decreasing trend over time and vary between and within country groups. Furthermore, our results suggest that while the FDI to China has encouraged both horizontal and vertical FDI to other countries, these FDI complementarities have been strongest in the case of vertical FDI. Tong, 2006a, 2006b; Cravino, Lederman and Olarreaga, 2007; García-Herrero and Santabárbara, 2007) . To the best of our knowledge, this is the first in-depth analysis of the effects of FDI in China on the FDI inflows into EU countries.
Is Foreign Direct Investment in China Crowding Out the Foreign Direct Investment in other Countries?

Introduction
In this paper we examine whether and to what extent the surge of the foreign direct investment (FDI) in China in recent years has come about at the expense of FDI inflows into other recipient countries.
China has recently become a leading destination for FDI. In a recent survey on FDI prospects, transnational companies rank China as one of the most attractive global business locations (UNCTAD, 2007) . In 2003, China overtook the US as the prime destination for FDI (Prasad and Wei, 2005) . Currently, China is the largest recipient of FDI in the developing This surge of FDI in China has followed the opening up of its economy to the world economy, and the selective easing of capital controls, while the main motivation driving these inflows of foreign investments is the availability of a large pool of low-cost labour force (Prasad and Wei, 2005) . However, in recent years there has been a shift of inward FDI in empirical analysis are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, we summarize our findings and conclude in Section 6.
Theoretical and Empirical Background
The theoretical framework of our analysis is the theory of multinational enterprises (MNEs), which has been formalized in several seminal papers by Markusen (1984 ), Helpman (1984 , and Venables (1997, 1998) . The theoretical models of MNEs explain the volume of FDI as a function of characteristics of the parent and host countries such as size, relative endowments, and transaction costs.
The theoretical literature distinguishes between foreign direct investment driven by "horizontal" and "vertical" motivations. Horizontal MNEs, or "market-seeking" FDI, produce the same goods and services in multiple locations, while vertical MNEs, or "efficiencyseeking" FDI, entail the geographic fragmentation of production into stages. Models of horizontal MNEs (Markusen, 1984; Markusen, 1987, 1992; and Venables, 1998, 2000) predict that MNEs will concentrate production in large countries and in countries with similar relative endowments, while models of vertical MNEs (Helpman, 1984; and Helpman and Krugman, 1985) predict that MNEs production will locate in relatively labour-abundant countries. It follows that while horizontal FDI is likely to dominate in bilateral investment flows between industrialized countries, vertical FDI is likely to dominate between developed -where headquarters are located -and developing countries, which instead host the production activity, as several empirical analyses demonstrated (Brainard, 1997; Markusen and Maskus, 2002 ).
An integrated treatment of horizontal and vertical FDI was developed by Markusen et al. (1996) and Markusen (1997) . 2 This approach was then tested empirically by Carr et al. (2001) who showed that both horizontal and vertical investments are important and related to parent and host country characteristics. In particular, their findings suggest that outward FDI from a parent to a host country increases in the sum of their economic size, the relative skills abundance of the parent country and the interaction between size and relative endowment differences.
In this theoretical framework, competition among host countries for inward investments has never been considered, though the issue seems to be interesting at least from a development perspective. In order to find some conceptual considerations about FDI competition we build on the international business approach to FDI (Dunning 1973) . This strand of literature formalizes the determinants of the decisions of firms to go abroad, with particular emphasis on the choice of mode of entry and of location. According to this literature, competition may arise when FDI inflows into one country divert FDI inflows from another country. Should this occur, it would not be due to resource constraints, rather because of market reasons as argued by Zhou and Lall (2005) . 3 Moreover, the intensity of such a competition is likely to vary considerably according to the motivations of becoming multinational. Horizontal FDI aims at increasing market shares or exploiting specific agglomeration economies. It would therefore flow towards those countries where industrial activity and demand are higher. This implies that inflows of FDI in one country, which offers
an attractive large domestic market should not preclude investments in other countries, provided that they also posses large and well developed markets. Since horizontal FDI tends to produce for local markets, country competition does not seem to be likely.
differences -becomes ambiguos due to the interaction with country size. Empirical studies provide support to this model (Markusen and Maskus, 2002; Bloningen et al., 2003 and Braconier et al. 2005) . 3 Competition in any resource flow may obviously occur when the resource in question is available in limited amounts. However, this "zero-sum" hypothesis is difficult to justify in the case of FDI. FDI represents only 12.6% of global gross domestic capital formation (UNCTAD, 2007) , and additional resources can be easily diverted from domestic resources and other international capital flows should investment opportunities arise. Moreover, multinational firms do not allocate investible funds on a geographical basis in order not to miss profitable opportunities. Finally, if one firm is not able to undertake a foreign investment because of resource constraints, there would be several other firms able to do so. See Zhou and Lall (2005) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
Vertical FDI implies the geographical fragmentation of the production chain into separate stages, according to each country's comparative advantage. This strategy enables multinational firms to exploit cost advantages where they arise. With further integration and cross-border co-operation, MNEs' activity has become more specialized and spatially fragmented, thus implying large investments within production networks. Provided that countries have distinctive advantages in different production stages, they could all benefit from large investment flows. 4 Complementarities among FDI inflows may be due to increases in demand for raw materials and intermediates, while the magnitude of the FDI creation (diversion) depends on the degree of fragmentation of the production chain.
5
The gravity model represents a very useful empirical framework to explain bilateral FDI flows since it allows testing at the same time several theoretical frameworks by combining different explanatory variables (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Brenton, et al., 1999; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Brainard, 1997 , Ekholm, 1998 Stein and Duade, 2007) .
Recent empirical analyses of multinational enterprise activity have identified other factors able to explain patterns of FDI. Thus, scholars have recently focused on the quality of institutions (Wei, 2000; Stein and Duade, 2001; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002; BenassyQuéré et al, 2007) . It has been demonstrated that good quality institutions in the parent and host countries have a positive effect on bilateral FDI flows via productivity growth and reduced uncertainty.
Existing empirical results on the effects of FDI in China on FDI in other countries are mixed. Tong (2006a, 2006b) show that the emergence of China as a leading 4 To the extent that host countries specialize in the same production stage, they become competitors, and MNEs have to make a choice among competing locations. Competition becomes negligible when production networks are organized on a regional base, as it has progressively occurred in the last two decades (Felker, 2003; Ravenhill, 1998) . 5 The degree of fragmentation of the production chain varies across sectors according to the technological intensity of the production process and the value added-weight ratio of the product. Only simple processes can be relocated to low-wage, low-skill countries, while only light, high-value products can be transported, allowing MNEs to exploit even small differences in production costs. The most fragmentable activities are those that are engineering based, such as machinery, automobiles and chemicals, while the least fragmentable are activities with continuous processes, such as food and paper processing (Zhou and Lall, 2005) .
FDI destination has encouraged FDI flows to other Asian countries via supply-chain production linkages but diverted those from OECD countries. They explain this diversion effect by the negative effect of distance on supply-chain production linkages. In contrast, Mercereau (2005) shows that, on average, FDI in China has had a negative effect on FDI in other Asian countries. However, it appears that this negative effect has been driven by two countries only, namely Singapore and Myanmar, while the FDI inflows into China have not affected the other Asian countries. Also Chantasasawat et al. (2005) , Zhou and Lall (2005) and Wang et al. (2007) 
Empirical Methodology
Following on from the theory of multinational enterprise (Markusen, 1984 (Markusen, , 1995 Helpman, 1984; Venables, 1997, 1998) and related empirical evidence (Eaton and Tamura, 1994; Eckholm 1998; Brenton et al., 1999; Wei, 2000; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Stein and Duade, 2007) (Eichengreen and Tong, 2006b; Mercereau, 2005) . Therefore, this variable captures FDI flows between developed and developing countries, which are very often of vertical type as formalized by Helpman (1984) . Should this be the case, we expect to find a positive effect on FDI flows.
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The quality of institutions at time t-1 in the host country (INST jt-1 ). It pertains not only to societal and governmental affairs, but also includes all costs associated with the risk involved in an investment. Uncertainty, political instability and their related risks can discourage FDI inflows despite favourable economic conditions (Wei, 2000; Globerman and Shapiro, 2002) . We expect a positive effect of the quality of institutions in the host country on bilateral FDI flows.
Home and host country fixed effects, ( , ) i j α β capture unobserved time-invariant factors specific to parent and destination countries which may influence bilateral FDI flows.
Time fixed effects ( ) t τ control for time-specific common shocks which may affect bilateral FDI flows (Mátyás, 1997) . ijt ε is the error term.
To estimate the effect of FDI flows into China on FDI flows into other host countries, we include in the baseline model (1) a measure of FDI flows into China at time t from each parent country i (FDICN it ). Unobserved global shocks can affect the attractiveness of FDI to
China and other countries, simultaneously. In order to correct for this potential endogeneity, we instrument FDICN it with a measure for the size of the market potential available for investors from home country i to China, and the absolute difference between GDP per capita in the home country i and GDP per capita in China at time t-1.
10
We estimate the following system of simultaneous equations:
The coefficient We first estimate the average effects of FDI inflows to China on FDI inflows to other countries, and then we allow the coefficient for FDI inflows to China to be different for EU15, the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe and the rest of the countries included in the sample. 11 In addition, we allow the coefficient of FDI into China to vary also over time.
Further, to test whether the China effect varies with FDI motivations, we interact the instrumented FDI in China with the proxy for horizontal and vertical FDI, i.e. the market size variable and the absolute difference in GDP per capita in the parent and host countries, respectively. 12 The estimated model therefore becomes as follows: 
Again, similar to the specifications described by model (2), we first estimate the average China effect and discuss the implied marginal effects, and then allow the coefficients of the interacted terms to differ for EU15, CEE and the other host countries. We also check whether these effects change over time.
Finally, we examine country-specific effects of the FDI to China.
The Data
The data on bilateral FDI flows is taken from the OECD direct foreign investment statistics the Political Constraint Index developed by Henisz (2000) . This index measures the feasibility of changes in policy, given the structure of the policy institutions and the preferences of the actors operating in those institutions. It takes values from 0 (high instability) to 1 (perfect stability). Further details on the data and variables description are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Since we estimate log specifications, we need to deal with the cases of zero and negative values for FDI flows. In the relevant literature, three approaches have been used. A first approach used among others by Rose (2000) 
Estimation Results
The average effect of FDI to China on FDI to other countries
Column (1) of Table 1 shows the estimates of the baseline model specification (1). The estimates are consistent with theory predictions and other empirical studies discussed in Section 2. On average, ceteris paribus, bilateral FDI flows were positively related to market size, similarity of relative endowments, and the quality of institutions in the host countries, though the latter is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. According to these results, bilateral FDI flows as a whole appear to be mainly market-rather than efficiencyseeking.
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[ Table 1 about here] 16 Estimates obtained for models (1) and (2) using zero and negative values and a Tobit estimator are shown in Table A2 in the Appendix. Additional results are available from the authors upon request. 17 The negative sign of absolute difference in per capita incomes may be also due to the fact that differences in wage levels are not compensated by productivity and skill levels. See Globerman and Shapiro (2002) for a discussion of this issue.
Column (2) of Table 1 shows the estimates for the system of simultaneous equations (2). As discussed in Section 3, we instrumented FDI inflows to China to account for the potential correlation of FDI inflows to China and the error term due to unobserved factors that might increase simultaneously the attractiveness of China and other countries as FDI destinations.
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The significance and sign of the coefficients of bilateral FDI flows are similar to those obtained with our baseline regression. Moreover, in this specification also the proxy for the quality of the institutions in the recipient countries turns out to be significant with the expected sign. countries, albeit to a lesser extent in comparison to non-EU recipient countries: a 10 percent 18 The results of the first stage regression of FDI inflows to China are shown in Table A3 in the Appendix. The estimated model explains 91 percent of the variation of FDI inflows to China. These estimates indicate that both the GDP per capita differential and the market size were positively associated with FDI inflows to China. These results are in line with the prediction of vertical MNEs models, with their assumed geographic fragmentation of production into stages, or horizontal MNEs models. Hence, we can conclude that, over the analyzed period, China was equally attractive for both market-and efficiency-seeking FDI.
increase in FDI flows to China, would raise FDI flows to the EU15 and CEE countries of about two and one percent, respectively.
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At least two reasons could explain our findings. First, FDI from European countries to China is mainly market-seeking rather than efficiency-seeking. Secondly, CEE countries and
China have a similar specialization within the international production chain and thus competition for FDI locations may partially offset the complementarities that usually characterize vertical FDI.
Previous results hold, on average, for the entire period considered. However, the China effect may have varied over time due to changes in international strategies of multinational firms or adaptation of foreign investors to changes in the investment climate in specific recipient countries. To account for these potential time-specific effects, we allowed the estimated coefficient for bilateral FDI flows to China to vary not only across groups of recipient countries, but also over time. where it became insignificant since the end of the 1990s. 21 Thus, our evidence suggests that FDI to China has not diverted FDI from other recipient countries; rather, it appears that there has been a FDI-creating effect, however decreasing over time.
[ Figure 1 about here] 19 The interpretation of the estimated coefficients in column (3) of These trends may be explained by the structural changes in the patterns of FDI to China and other recipient countries occurred in the last decades. Given the objective of this paper, two different phenomena seem to be relevant. First of all, during the considered period, China's economy expanded rapidly, with an average annual growth rate above eight percent over the period. This impressive economic growth has attracted relatively more marketseeking FDI, mainly from advanced economies (Branstetter and Lardy, 2006) , thus reducing the opportunities to generate complementarities with FDI flows to other recipient countries through vertical FDI. Secondly, the geography of global production networks has changed over the past decades (Felker, 2003; Ravenhill, 1998; Ma and Van Assche, 2011) . In particular, production networks have become less global and more regional in character, thus further reducing, on the one hand, complementarities in FDI flows between countries belonging to different stages of the production chain but located in different geographical areas -i.e. the EU15 and China -and, on the other hand, potential competition with countries specialized in similar production stages but belonging to different regional production networks, such as CEECs and China. However, this does not mean that China is an attractive location only for production networks centered in East Asia. Recent empirical evidence has in fact demonstrated that China's attractiveness as offshoring location does not rely only on its low labour costs but also on its geographical location. Therefore, also production networks centered in the Western hemisphere may integrate China, but with a different role with respect to the previous ones. While the former exploit China's proximity to input suppliers, the latter consider China's proximity to export markets as main determinant of their delocalisation process (Ma and Van Assche, 2011) . Therefore, despite the regionalization of production networks, China remains an attractive offshoring location for European multinational firms, which considers it as an export platform for Asian markets, rather than an assembly location for products to be sold in Western markets.
Overall, these considerations suggest that the intensity of the China effect is not independent from motivations for FDI. We explore next how the effect of FDI to China may differ depending on the horizontal or vertical motivation of FDI.
The effect of FDI to China on horizontal and vertical FDI to other countries
According to the theoretical framework discussed in Section 2, complementarities in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here]
Column (1) of Table 2 shows that the direct effect of FDI to China is on average negative and significant at the one percent level, while the coefficients of the interacted variables are both positive, though only the impact on vertical FDI seems to be statistically different from the direct effect at the conventional level. Since we are estimating an interaction model with two continuous variables, to interpret the intensity and the direction of the China effect we have to take into consideration the values taken by the two modifying variables, i.e. MKTSIZE and GDPCAP differentials, as illustrated by Equation (5):
22 22 Note that in models with multiplicative interactions, the estimated coefficients of the variables involved into the interactions reflect conditional relationships. This implies that the coefficient of the China effect variable (ln FDICN) may be interpreted as the impact of FDI into China on FDI flows into other recipient countries only when both the market size and GDP per capita difference variables are equal to zero. Figure 2 , which also shows China's average value of per capita income differential variable for comparison. 23 In particular, it becomes positive when both variables assume their mean sample values.
[ Figure 2 about here]
As expected, Figure 2 shows that the China effect is negative and statistically significant when host and parent countries' GDPs per capita are very similar, which suggests that FDI inflows into China are substitutes for FDI in other recipient countries regardless of their market advantages. 24 As parent and host countries become more dissimilar, the marginal effect of FDI in China becomes first less negative, and then positive, although it is statistically significant only for values of the GDP per capita difference variable higher than that assumed by the same variable concerning China.
Overall, these results suggest that an increase in FDI flows to China diverts FDI flows from countries less competitive than China, and creates additional FDI flows to countries that are more competitive than China in terms of cost efficiency but regardless of their market attractiveness. Therefore, it appears that the average positive effect detected in the previous sub-section is driven by vertical and not horizontal FDI, as suggested by the theory.
This general trend is present in European countries. However, the China effect on vertical FDI in European countries is stronger than in non-European countries, while the effect on horizontal FDI in European countries is weaker than in other non-European countries, as indicated by the signs of the estimated coefficients for the corresponding variables reported in column 2 of Table 2 .
The China effect on horizontal and vertical FDI is constant over time, with the exception of the China effect on vertical FDI flows to EU15, which tends to halve during the considered period as indicated by the coefficients reported in Table 3 . This could signal a weakening of global production networks in favour of more geographically segmented production networks (Lall and Albaladejo, 2004) , with China and Western EU countries more and more involved in different geographical networks.
( There are several alternative reasons for this surprising result and they should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. First of all, Bulgaria, Romania and the Russian Federation are among the least developed countries in our sample. Therefore, they are not only quite dissimilar from the OECD source countries included in the sample, but on average more competitive than China. Secondly, India and Japan, though quite dissimilar one from each other, belong to the same regional production network and, as suggested by the literature, this increases the probability of developing complementary relationships with China. 27 Thirdly, FDI inflows in some of these countries may be motivated by different reasons with respect to FDI flows into China, thus reducing the probability to generate competition for FDI and/or increasing potentialities for developing complementary effects.
For example, the USA and Japan may be interesting locations for strategic seeking FDI, i.e.
foreign investments looking for advanced technology and skilled labour force, which may help MNEs, mainly those coming from less developed source countries, to strengthen their strategic assets. Therefore, they can be considered as complementary rather than competitive locations to China. Most of MNEs investing in the Russian Federation, instead, are attracted by its enormous endowments of natural resources; therefore, the positive impact exerted by FDI to China may simply reflect an increase in China's demand for raw materials. 28 Again, most of FDI in advanced countries have been undertaken by foreign enterprises involved in financial intermediations and other services, mainly business services. Therefore, it is likely that FDI flows to China, being more concentrated in the manufacturing sectors, complement rather than substitute FDI in services. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analyzed the effects of FDI to China originating from OECD countries on FDI to European Union and other countries. In particular, we have estimated a modified 27 Several studies have shown that FDI flows to China have not diverted FDI from other Asian countries. For example, see Humphrey and Schmitz (2007) , Weiss (2007) , Chantasasawat et al. (2004) and Tong (2006a and 2006b) . 28 A similar effect has been found by García-Herrero and Santabárbara (2007) in relation to the impact of FDI to China on FDI flows to Latin America. 29 On the complementary relationship between FDI in manufacturing and services see Nefussi and Schwellnus (2007) . Our results suggest that, over the analyzed period, bilateral FDI flows originating from OECD countries took place mainly among countries with similar factor endowments and large markets, and responded positively to high levels of institutional quality in the host countries. These results are in line with the theory of multinational enterprises and consistent with previous empirical studies. Moreover, they suggest that most of the bilateral FDI recorded in our sample responded to market rather than efficiency motivations.
We have provided empirical evidence showing that, ceteris paribus, FDI inflows into China rose FDI flows to other countries. However, this complementary relationship was not constant across country groups, being less strong in Europe than outside Europe. Within Europe, the most negatively affected countries were the new EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe. This result indicates that the advantage of these latter countries related to their proximity to FDI source countries was not sufficient to neutralize the attractiveness of China as a FDI destination. Our results also indicate that the China effect has decreased over time, thus suggesting the weakening of links with global production networks.
The surge of FDI to China has encouraged both horizontal and vertical FDI to the other countries in our sample. In the case of EU15, the FDI complementarity has been lower in the case of horizontal FDI and higher in the case of vertical FDI in comparison with non-EU host countries.
We have also examined the China effect on a country basis, and found that, while on average the FDI creation effect prevailed, there were a number of cases in which FDI to China diverted FDI from other host countries. This fact mainly concerns pairs of similar countries within EU15, CEE and between some Latin American countries and some CEE countries.
Most interestingly, we have found that FDI inflows to China did not crowd out FDI inflows to a small group of host countries. This group includes four mature and relatively high-income economies -USA, Sweden, Italy and Spain -four emerging relatively low-income countries,
i.e. Bulgaria, Romania, Russia and India, and two small medium-level countries, such as Malta and Cyprus.
The main conclusion of our analysis is that, on average, FDI to China had no diversion effects, but significant variation between and within country groups existed.
Therefore, the issue of competition for investment needs to be further explored in-depth in order to clearly identify factors driving complementary and diversionary effects. To this purpose, more disaggregated bilateral FDI data at sectoral and firm level would help to disentangle specific effects and to estimate more precisely the China effect on FDI to other countries.
In so doing, other important points should be kept in mind. First of all, the China effect depends on China's absolute attractiveness for FDI and on the types of FDI it will attract in the future. If China will maintain its present growth rates, it will become more similar to source countries, thus attracting more market-seeking FDI and less efficiencyseeking FDI. Therefore, there will be less room to develop complementarities between FDI flows to China and FDI to other countries. However, China is becoming an attractive location for more value added FDI in both manufacturing and services sectors. These structural 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 other recipient countries CEE countries EU15 countries China net effect in each recipient country has been computed as follows:
The corresponding estimated coefficients are those reported in Table 2 
